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Abstract. For most Russians, the year 1917 is primarily connected with the 
centennial of the February Revolution and the subsequent October events. 
This is quite logical, as 1917 is justly considered a landmark in modern 
Russian history, after which both the country and the world could not return 
to their previous condition and instead followed a new trajectory of social 
development. Influenced by Russian revolutionary ideas and Russia’s 
subsequent modernization, many countries reformed their capitalist 
economies to create welfare states and abandoned authoritarianism and 
formal democracy, while turning to a more open and diversified system of 
power and government. They also curtailed their suppression of individual 
freedoms while giving citizens more opportunities for self-expression. These 
developments became possible due to a thorough reflection on the Russian 
experience and its creative interpretation in the economy, state government, 
and social interactions.  
The author addresses the following key questions in his article: did Russians 
themselves manage to reflect on this experience? In other words, did they 
learn from this experience? In analyzing the crucial events of 1917 and 
pointing to some later and contemporary parallels, he outlines his stance 
toward them.  
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Аннотация. В сознании россиян 1917 год связывается, прежде всего, 
со столетием Февральской революции и последующими за ней 
октябрьскими событиями. И не случайно. Ведь тысяча девятьсот 
семнадцатый справедливо считается переломным моментом новейшей 
истории, после которого Россия и мир уже не могли быть прежними и 
начали развиваться по новой социальной траектории. Многие 
государства под влиянием идей русского революционизма и практики 
постреволюционной модернизации развернулись от дикого капитализма 
к социальной ориентированной экономике, отказались от 
авторитаризма и формальной демократии в пользу открытой и 
диверсифицированной системы власти и управления, перестали 
подавлять личность и предоставили людям больше прав для 
самореализации. Все это стало возможным благодаря глубокому 
осмыслению русского опыта, его творческой переработке в сферах 
экономического моделирования, государственного строительства и 
социальных взаимоотношений.  
Автор формулирует следующие ключевые вопросы: как у россиян 
обстоит дело с рефлексией? иначе говоря, усвоили ли они собственный 
опыт, извлекли ли уроки из своего прошлого? Анализируя события 
вековой давности и проводя параллели с более поздними событиями и 
современностью, он обозначает свою позицию в ответ на них. 
 
Ключевые слова: Россия, 1917, революции, россияне, опыт, 
осмысление. 
 
 
Looking back from the present moment, it is difficult to give an 
unambiguous answer to the questions posed above. Perhaps it would be 
more correct to say that Russians have learned some historical lessons from 
their past and have not managed to learn others. Besides, it is unlikely that 
in just a hundred years—an insignificant period by historical standards—it 
would be possible to completely “digest” this whole block of historical 
heritage, and then to calmly separate the rational and positive things from 
the odious ones, gently incorporating them into one social synthesis. 
Russians simply did not have time for this sort of reflection because 
throughout the entire post-revolutionary period the country was either 
fighting or preparing for war, or in a permanent state of constant civil 
confrontation of one form or another. This entire experience remains rather 
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stressful for the Russian people. It can be said that Russians only recently 
began to move away from the initial emotional stage of reflecting on the 
events of 1917 so that sensus ceased to prevail over the ratio. Nevertheless, 
despite the extreme conditions of life, the acute perception of the past, and 
its ambiguous assessment in the national collective consciousness, I argue 
that Russian society has succeeded in comprehending the main lessons and 
universal principles of its further existence, while taking into account the 
past, although not to the full extent. 
For example, few people in Russia think that another social revolution 
in this country is likely or desirable. Precisely because of historical 
experience, most understand that any new man-made cataclysms would 
lead to the death of the nation and the state, and that current technological 
advances could give this process a global scope. Russians, one might say, 
have developed an immunity to revolutions. Otherwise, how can we explain 
the fact that in 1991 and 1993 the vast majority of citizens did not allow 
themselves to be drawn into a very dangerous confrontation with the 
authorities, and in our day, they refuse point blank to join the protest 
movement in sufficient numbers to launch the next “color” project in 
Russia? At the same time, we see that there are many direct and indirect 
domestic factors that have given rise to popular discontent. First and 
foremost, these factors include striking property stratification, legal 
inequality, social injustice, a weak social safety net, and widespread poverty. 
Together these negative phenomena testify to the regression of the social 
system and the archaization of social structure, leading to the revival of long-
obsolete class approaches to social life. Turning to the events of the early 
twentieth century, it can be said that the succession of Russian revolutions 
was prompted by a sharp social differentiation that angered the 
overwhelming majority of the population enough to fight back.1 
Misunderstanding or ignoring this historical experience is a direct rooute to 
social turbulence and cataclysm. In this context, one of the main lessons of 
1917 is that society itself, and especially the excessively rich, should not 
provoke revolution by encouraging and conserving extreme proprietary and 
other social inequalities. On the contrary, it is necessary to work to ensure 
that such problems in social development be mitigated. 
That said, inequality will never be leveled by itself, for however 
psychologically difficult it is for individuals to part with a portion of wealth 
in favor of their neighbors, it is equally problematic for an entire social 
stratum to do so. Hence, there must be a force capable of ensuring certain 
behaviors at the macro level, encouraging or requiring large masses of 
people to follow them; this force is the state. Possessing the mechanisms of 
sovereign power, this political apparatus sets the course of movement for 
the whole of society in a chosen direction. For example, the so-called “welfare 
                                                 
1 All Russian social thinkers of the twentieth century wrote about social injustice as the cause 
of the Russian revolutions. See, for example, Berdiaev 1990; Rozanov 2001; Il`in 1993 et al. 
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state” pursues a policy of redistribution of material possessions in 
accordance with the principles of social justice for the sake of achieving a 
decent standard of living for all citizens, smoothing out social differences 
and helping those in need. With this approach on the part of the authorities, 
society begins to realize and appreciate the advantages of social peace; it 
strengthens its solidarity and integrity, and becomes immune to radical 
ideas and their carriers. On the contrary, the class state fosters traditionally 
asymmetric distribution of material and social resources in society. The 
majority of the population perceives such a structure as unfair, the society 
is divided, and one part begins to protest, creating a revolutionary situation. 
In the case of the success of a revolution or coup, state authority is swept 
away together with the social order it defends, and the “cursed days”2 begin. 
Such cause and effect relationships, rather simple in the doctrinal sense, 
but unfortunately very difficult to comprehend in social practice, are also an 
invaluable historical experience. Their essence lies in the fact that the 
modern state by nature can only be generally social, but not class-oriented. 
This is almost an axiom of contemporary life, for it is hardly worth proving 
that state power becomes fully legitimate only if it is recognized by a broad 
swath of the population, as well as the fact that stability in society directly 
depends on the state's ability to perform social functions. 
Undoubtedly, if the state does not want revolutionary upheaval, then it 
should not only be social, but also strong. After all, Soviet statehood was 
rooted in the people (obschenarodnaia gosudarstvennost`), but could not 
protect the country from erosion and collapse. The power of the Provisional 
Government and the tsarist regime were incomparably weaker. The latter 
decomposed so much that, according to Vasilii Shul`gin, an early twentieth 
century politician, “There was not a battalion of soldiers to protect the 300-
year-old monarchy” (2015, 214). Today, when a wave of “color” revolutions 
(Lobanov 2015) has swept across the world, mercilessly eliminating 
unstable, internally fragile regimes, these lessons of the past have become 
more relevant. 
This last point is of even greater importance for multinational, complex 
states. For such systems, an era of revolutions and wars always provokes a 
severe test of survival. In a period of calm economic development and 
growth, national problems within the country are not usually very 
pronounced. However, when central authorities encounter turmoil, 
peripheral territories are quick to declare their sovereignty, announce 
secession, and so forth. Thus, the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman 
empires failed to withstand such stress tests. The disintegration of these 
great powers is a direct result of revolutionary events and the unprecedented 
surge of nationalism. At the same time, post-imperial sovereignty, as a rule, 
does not bring obvious advantages to the former national provinces. 
                                                 
2 The revolutionary chaos and terror in Russia was realistically described by the Nobel prize 
winner in literature, Ivan Bunin (1991). 
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Moreover, many of them are unable to support their own statehood due to 
the weakness of their economies, the lack of traditions of statehood, and 
internal conflict. Within these failed states, a process of reverse 
crystallization begins around one center of attraction and power. Most of the 
outskirts of the former tsarist Russia rallied in 1922 around the Russian 
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic to form a new state, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics. The same was done by the Yugoslav fragments of the 
collapsed Danube Empire, which were drawn like drops of mercury to the 
Serbian state and created the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 
1918 (later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, then the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia). Both federations—Soviet and Yugoslav—were built on a new 
ideological basis, and, it would seem, should have been more monolithic 
than the previous superstate formations of the imperial period. However, the 
virus of nationalism, brought to life by the revolutionary cataclysms of the 
early twentieth century, proved to be stronger and more tenacious than the 
communist doctrine.5 The socialist federations did not survive the new 
onslaught of nationalist revolutionary sentiment and ultimately collapsed. 
Events repeated themselves and with immeasurably greater losses. As a 
result, the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak federations were not to be reborn, 
while Russia, which survived from 1991 to 2001 in a state of political and 
economic half-decay, eventually restored integration, albeit with great 
difficulty. Yet even this success will ultimately be doomed to failure if the 
collective consciousness of the people does not recognize the need for a limit 
on revolutions in Russia. Another revolutionary shock in this country would 
unequivocally lead to a new explosion of nationalism and separatism, which 
would mean its death as a federal state. To avert this devastating cycle of 
sansára is in the powers of society and the authorities, provided, of course, 
that they understand their past miscalculations. 
In reflecting on the period of revolutions and wars in modern Russian 
history, we cannot but mention the role of the human factor in the course 
of social upheaval and changes. Along with the public and political 
institutional dimensions, this section of analysis deserves no less attention. 
As experience shows, people participate in revolutionary and post-
revolutionary events under the influence of certain ideologies, prompted by 
interested political organizations. Depending on the doctrines and political 
leadership, l'homme révolté becomes either a destructive or constructive 
force of social change.6 One might recall, however, that under the influence 
of communist ideology, Soviet man—the ultimate subversion of the old social 
structure—turned into a builder and defender of his restored great country. 
To be clear, I do not advocate for the reanimation of Marxist-Leninist theory 
in Russia or in any other country. At the same time, it is clear what an 
                                                 
5 For more details see Lobanov 2014. 
 
6 See Camus 1999. 
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ideological vacuum can lead to in the present context. Today, Russian 
society and the authorities are faced with the task of creating a new national 
idea that can unite people. The basic concepts of this emerging ideology are 
citizenship, statehood, patriotism, great national culture, and a heroic past. 
This is now increasingly spoken about by ordinary Russians and 
government representatives. If such an ideological system is proposed and 
adopted by the majority of society at the level of both consciousness and 
practice, it will be very difficult to organize a rebelión de las masas in 
Russian society, and citizens will not have to make a painful choice between 
social organization and disorganization.7 
Faith has always been an important spiritual component in the life of 
both individuals and society. For many centuries, Orthodoxy gave the 
Russians and the entire Orthodox world a sense of meaning and created the 
necessary internal energy for social creativity. Atheistic power, the rejection 
of God and the persecution of faith, sowed confusion among the people and 
ultimately cultivated new spiritual principles, which later proved to be 
unviable. Do all social changes necessarily lead to the overthrow of the 
traditional foundations of society, including its spiritual component? 
Probably, but this is a universal enigma of modern history, which must be 
deciphered not only for our people, but for the whole of mankind. 
It is from the perspective of the global, universal principles of 
coexistence (homo—mensura) that the world community should also reflect 
on a larger problem: the human element in how social change is 
implemented. Are social revolutions humane in their essence? Is this the 
only way for individuals to ameliorate conditions that do not satisfy their 
reality? The Russian experience of the twentieth century suggests otherwise. 
Colossal in its destruction and human suffering, the Civil War in Russia in 
1918–22, triggered by the February and October revolutions, was anti-
human, as anti-human in its content as the revolutions that gave birth to 
it. The leader of Russian Bolshevism, Vladimir Lenin, drawing a parallel 
between the Russian and the French revolutions, asserted, “Take the history 
of the French Revolution; see what Jacobinism is. This is a struggle for an 
objective without fear of any decisive plebeian measures, a struggle not in 
white gloves, a struggle without tenderness, and unafraid to resort to the 
guillotine” (Cited in Valentinov-Vol`ski 1953). Even more inhuman are the 
revolutionary upheavals of this time and for good reason. First, the causes 
of most revolutions of the post-bipolar era are not class, but rather ethno-
confessional conflict, which is among the most brutal and implacable forms 
of confrontation. Second, the arsenal of revolutionary struggle has expanded 
to such an extent that it can destroy not only the immediate adversary, but 
also the whole of mankind in the event the situation spirals out of control. 
Third, the revolutions of the current century have a different format: they 
quite easily overcome the local framework and expand to entire geographic 
                                                 
7 See Ortega y Gasset 2016. 
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regions, thus broadening the zone of social destruction; the extent of 
collective violence thus increases exponentially. With all of this in mind, the 
human population must search for and find alternative (and more humane) 
methods than revolutionary changes to social life. Early twentieth century 
strategies have already been deployed in global practice. For example, in 
politics, the social-democratic tradition was a clear expression of the 
evolutionary side of social development. In economic life, it was the 
convergent model; in ideology, it was the paradigm of solidarity and reform. 
Those states that used these tools of smooth, harmonious social 
reconstruction eventually turned out to be the winners, in contrast to those 
who preferred to move toward progress by fits and starts.9 Today, Russian 
society and the Russian state, as well as other young democracies, have the 
imperative to adhere to the evolutionary path of development and to make 
maximum use of the mechanisms of self-organization and integration to 
achieve socially positive results. The lessons of the past should warn against 
diversion from this chosen course and the danger of succumbing to the 
temptation to solve problems quickly in one fell swoop. 
 
   
 
The topic of revolution is, of course, vast. It is not exhausted by the 
aforementioned dimensions of social ties, state power, personality, and the 
global development of society. Nor does it end with such analysis. That said, 
one thing is clear: Russia’s revolutionary heritage and its meaning for 
Russians and other peoples endures. Not all questions have been answered, 
not all experiences have been mastered, and not all lessons have been 
learned. For various reasons, many elements remain outside of objective, 
honest, and thorough analysis. Until this is no longer the case, the main 
demands of our time—the achievement and preservation of social unity, the 
resolution of civil divisions and conflict, and in turn, security and prosperity 
for the entire world community—will remain unsatisfied. 
 
Translated from Russian by Alexander M. Amatov  
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